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—I Rethinking	  radical	  Italian	  thought,	  displacing	  it	  in	  a	  context	  other	  than	  the	  Italian	  one,	  can	  help	  us	  to	  better	  discern	  its	  qualities,	  but	  also	  its	   limits.	  It	  should	  provoke	  us	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  questions	  about	  its	  reception	  and	  its	  exportability;	  to	  ‘provincialize’	  it,	  as	  Brett	  Neilson	  writes	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  
Cultural	  Studies	  Review.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  identifying	  both	  its	  possibilities	  of	  contagion	  with	  other	  theories	  and	  practices,	  and	  its	  shortcomings	  in	  responding	  to	  questions	  and	  problems	  that	  are	  foreign	  to	  the	  Italian	  context.	  The	  displacement	  of	  our	  object	  of	  analysis	  should	  also	  involve	  a	  displacement	   of	   our	   own	   way	   of	   thinking	   as	   Italians.	   Speaking	   personally,	   I	   can’t	   help	   asking	  myself	  about	  the	  subjective	  motivations	  and	  relations	  that	  took	  me	  to	  Australia	  and	  Sydney	  twice	  in	  one	  year.1	  I	  think	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  questions	  that	  I’ve	  heard	  female	  researchers	  and	  students	  ask	  of	   Italian	  feminism	  in	  Sydney,	  Melbourne	  and	  Auckland	  too.	   I	   think	  of	  a	  certain	  ease	  of	  dialogue	  between	  men	  and	   feminists	   that	   is	   less	   suspicious	   than	  what	  we’re	  used	   to	   in	   Italy.	  There	   is	   an	  openness	  to	  the	  other	  and	  to	  otherness,	  which	  might	  derive	  from	  Australia	  being	  a	  multicultural	  society.	   The	   relativisation	   of	   Europe,	   and	   even	   more	   so	   of	   Italy,	   happens	   spontaneously	   when	  looked	  at	   from	  Australia	  with	  Asia	   in	  between.	  All	   this	  adds	  up	  to	  an	   ‘Australian	  Effect’	   that	  has	  profoundly	  changed	  me	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  changes	  my	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  the	  ‘Italian	  Effect’.	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I	   am	   therefore	   writing	   from	   within	   a	   relationship	   to	   this	   context	   that	   already	   marks	   me,	  questions	  me	  and	  dislocates	  me,	  and	  my	  intention	  is	  to	  yield	  not	  so	  much	  a	  thought	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  
thought,	  born	  and	  bred	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  a	  political	  practice.	  In	   his	   introduction	   to	   this	   issue,	   Brett	   Neilson	   points	   out	   that	   what	   distinguishes	   radical	  Italian	  thought	   is	  not	  so	  much	  its	   theoretical	  corpus,	  which	  has	  developed	  in	  parallel	  with	  other	  contemporary	  international	  trends,	  but	  more	  its	  entrenchment	  in	  the	  political	  struggles	  that	  have	  characterised	   the	   ‘Italian	   laboratory’	   for	   decades.	   This	   is	   even	  more	   the	   case	   for	   the	   thought	   of	  sexual	  difference,	  which	  was	  also	  born	  and	  developed	   in	  constant	  dialogue	  with	  other	   trends	   in	  international	   feminism,	  but	  which	  is	  also	  radically	  distinguished	  by	  its	  entrenchment	   in	  political	  
and	  theoretical	  practice,	  indeed	  for	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘practice’	  that	  it	  adopts.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  theory	  of	  sexual	  difference	  was	  not	  only	  born	  out	  of	  the	  political	  practices	  of	  feminism—such	  as	  self-­‐awareness,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘practice	   of	   the	   unconscious’,	   the	   practice	   of	   relations	   between	  women—but	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  theoretical	  practice.2	  It	  is	  a	  style	  of	  thinking	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  method	  of	  beginning	  from	  oneself,	  by	  the	  metonymical	  relation	  between	  what	  we	  experience	  and	  what	  we	  say,	  and	  by	  a	  privileging	  of	  the	  reference	  to	  female	  genealogy	  rather	  than	  accredited	  and	  institutionalised	  traditions,	  disciplines	  and	  schools.3	  This	   style	   of	   thinking	   means	   that	   there	   is	   neither	   a	   split	   between	   theory	   and	   experience,	  thinking	  and	  action,	  ends	  and	  means,	  nor	  between	  the	  enunciated	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  enunciation,	  the	  transformation	  of	  reality	  and	  of	  the	  self,	  as	  is	  usually	  the	  case	  in	  movements	  of	  transformation	  and	   revolutions.	  Rather	   there	   is	   a	   coming	   together	   in	   a	   virtual	   loop,	  which	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	  keep	  alive	  the	  original	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  feminism	  as	  a	  movement	  of	  sexed	  subjectivity	  that	  cannot	   be	   reified	   into	   an	   objective	   ‘female	   question’	   or	   crystallised	   into	   a	   female	   collective	  identity.	  The	  movement	  of	  sexual	  difference	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  theoretical,	  linguistic	  and	  political	  practice	  that	  works	  in	  context	  and	  that	  measures	  its	  results,	  gains,	  losses	  and	  displacements	  as	  a	  function	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   this	   context.	   Precisely	   because	   of	   these	   defining	   traits,	   the	  thought	   of	   sexual	   difference	   refuses	   to	   lend	   itself	   to	   being	   summed	   up	   as	   a	   finished,	   abstract	  ‘corpus’,	   but	   exists	   as	   a	   thinking-­‐in-­‐progress.	   It	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   practices	   that	   generate	   and	  regenerate	   it	   in	  the	  historical	  contexts	  where	  it	  operates.	   It	   is	  thus	  a	  thinking	  that	  doesn’t	  really	  lend	   itself	   to	   being	   ‘transferred’	   elsewhere,	   but	   rather—again,	   metonymically—it	   enters	   into	  contact	  with	  and	  infects	  other	  contexts.	  
—II Naturally,	   contact	   and	   contagion	   are	   not	   always	   easy	   or	   ‘soft’	   and	   do	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	  mutual	   comprehension,	  more	  often	   they	   lead	   to	  misunderstandings	  and	  mistranslations.	  This	   is	  why	  I	  like	  them.	  I	  don’t	  believe	  in	  the	  wondrous	  forces	  of	  Habermasian	  communicative	  action	  and	  democratic	   understanding.	  We	  were	   all	   born	   in	   the	   post-­‐psychoanalytic	   era	   and	  we	   know	   that	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communication	  is	  never	  transparent.	  It	  often	  functions,	  when	  it	  does	  function,	  not	  so	  much	  thanks	  
to	   but	   ‘in	   spite	   of	   dialogue’,	   to	   use	   a	   felicitous	   expression	   of	   the	   Italian	   philosopher	   Giacomo	  Marramao.4	  This	  is	  also	  true	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  and	  what	  is	   here	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘radical	   Italian	   thought’,	   and	  more	   generally	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	  feminism	   and	   radical	   movements	   in	   Italy	   from	   1968	   onwards.	   It	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   this	  relationship	   is	   anything	   but	   linear.	   Contrary	   to	   popular	   belief	   on	   the	   left,	   which	   considers	  feminism	  to	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  derivative	  of	  ’68,	  born	  from	  ’68	  like	  Eve	  from	  Adam’s	  side,	  feminism	  was	  born	   before	   ’68	   and	   grew	   up—as	   Carla	   Lonzi	   wrote—despite	   ’68	   (and	   in	   Italy,	   despite	   ’77	   and	  
Autonomia).5	   It	   traumatised	   the	   whole	   ‘new	   left’	   in	   the	   1970s	  with	   the	   exodus	   of	   women	  who	  denounced	  the	  limits	  and	  the	  violence	  of	  masculine	  theories	  and	  practices,	  and	  it	  developed	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  when	  other	  movements	  were	  on	  the	  decline.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  part	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  other	  movements;	  rather	  it	  interacts	  with	  them	  from	  an	  asymmetrical	  position.6	  It	  moves,	  as	  Carla	  Lonzi	  would	  say	  again,	  on	  another	  plane,	  where	  male	  radicalism	  is	  not	  very	  inclined	  to	  follow.7	  Thirty-­‐five	  years	  later,	  however,	  the	  time	  is	  right	  to	  reconsider	  the	  ‘season	  of	  movements’	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  perspective,	  putting	  forward	  a	  more	  general	  historical-­‐political	  question.	  In	  Italy	  as	  in	  other	   Western	   countries	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970s	   onwards,	   three	   events	   can	   be	   observed	  simultaneously:	  the	  crisis—or	  the	  end,	  as	  the	  Italian	  philosopher	  Mario	  Tronti	  claims,8	  and	  I	  agree	  with	  him—of	  the	  paradigm	  of	  modern	  politics;	  the	  birth	  of	  movements	  and	  of	  a	  new	  antagonistic	  thought;	  and	  the	  explosion	  of	  feminism	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  crisis—or	  the	  end,	  as	  some	  Italian	  feminist	  thinkers	  claim—of	  patriarchy.9	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  three	  events?	  In	  Italy	  as	  in	  other	  Western	  countries,	  the	   generation	   that	   had	   access	   to	   politics	   in	   the	   season	   of	   ’68	   was—and	   still	   is—more	   of	   a	  
genderation,	  a	  generation	  marked	  by	   the	  cut	  carried	  out	  by	  women	  within	   its	  ranks.	  What	  were	  the	   consequences	  of	   this	   cut	   in	   the	  public	   sphere	  and	  how	  can	  we	   capitalise	  on	   them	   today?	   In	  other	  words,	  what	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  end	  of	  modern	  politics,	  the	  end	  of	  patriarchy,	  and	  the	  search	  for	  a	  new	  political	  anthropology?	  And	  what	  are	  its	  implications	  for	  a	  new	  practice	  of	  transformation	  that	  the	  tragedies	  we	  are	  witnessing	  every	  day	  urgently	  demand	  of	  us?	  
—III I	  will	  soon	  return	  to	  this	  question.	  But	  first	  let	  us	  ponder	  a	  little	  bit	  longer	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference,	  in	  order	  to	  dissipate	  some	  of	  the	  suspicions	  that	  still	  surround	  it	  in	  its	  Anglo-­‐American	  reception,	  and	  also	  in	  Italian	  feminism	  itself.	  The	  main	  suspicion	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  essentialist	  way	  of	  thinking	   that	   accounts	   for	   neither	   the	   difference	   between	   sex	   (understood	   as	   an	   irreducible	  biological	   reality)	   and	   gender	   (understood	   as	   a	   cultural	   construction	   and	   social	   norm)	   nor	   the	  overcoming	  of	  this	  distinction	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  discursivity	  of	  both	  sex	  and	  gender)	  elaborated	  in	  the	  American	  debate.10	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This	   suspicion	   is	   without	   foundation.	   It	   stems	   from	   a	   basic	   miscomprehension	   of	   the	  expression	  ‘thought	  of	  sexual	  difference’,	  in	  which	  sexual	  difference	  is	  not	  an	  object	  but	  a	  subject;	  not	   a	   signified	   but	   a	   signifier.	   The	   object	   of	   the	   thought	   of	   sexual	   difference	   is	   not	   the	   social	  condition	  of	  women,	  nor	  the	  identity,	  and	  much	  less	  the	  essence	  of	  woman.	  Its	  subject	  is	  a	  sexed	  singularity	  that	  considers	  her/himself,	  the	  other	  and	  reality	  freely,	  outside	  of	  the	  prescribed	  and	  prescriptive	  definitions	  of	  sexual	  identity	  that	  the	  symbolic	  order	  transmits	  to	  us.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  an	  analysis	   of	   how	   sex	   and	   gender	   are	   constructed	   and	   performed	   by	   language—an	   analysis	   that	  allies	   us	   with	   much	   contemporary	   international	   feminism.	   It	   is,	   above	   all,	   a	   practice	   of	   the	  inscription	   of	   sex	   and	   gender	   in	   language,	   in	   the	   play,	   which	   is	   always	   a	   political	   play,	   of	  significance—a	  practice	  that	  distinguishes	  us	  from	  the	  panorama	  of	  international	  feminism.	  It	  is—once	  again—a	  cut.	   In	  Luisa	  Muraro’s	  words,	   it	   is	   the	  metonymical	   cut	   that	   speech	   linked	   to	   the	  body	   and	   to	   experience	   introduces	   into	   the	   metaphorical	   drift	   of	   political	   discourse,	   which	   is	  traditionally	  a	  discourse	  abstracted	  from	  the	  body	  and	  from	  experience.11	  Historically,	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  is	  a	  thought	  of	  female	  difference	  because	  it	  was	  women	  who	  saw	  and	  politicised	  the	  nexus	  between	  sexuality	  and	  the	  socio-­‐symbolic	  order.	  It	  was	  feminist	  practices	   such	  as	   self-­‐awareness	   that	   showed	  us	  how	  acquiring	  a	  voice	   can	   change	   the	  material	  reality	  of	  a	  subject	  who	  has	  historically	  been	  excluded	  from	  language	  or	  has	  been	  obliged	  to	   speak	   in	   the	   language	  of	   the	  other.	  But	   the	  bid	  of	   the	   ‘politics	   of	   the	   symbolic’,	   as	  we	   Italian	  feminists	  synthetically	  refer	  to	  a	  politics	  that	  wants	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	   social	   and	   the	   symbolic	   order	   and	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   contact	   between	   language	   and	  experience,	  can	  be	  recast	  for	  everyone.12	  The	   current	   transformations	   of	   the	   political	   anthropology	   of	   globalised	   societies	   (and	   the	  tension	   between	   the	   logic	   of	   identity	   and	   difference	   that	   runs	   through	   them)	   confer	   an	  unprecedented	   topicality	   to	   the	   paradigm	   of	   change	   elaborated	   by	   the	   thought	   of	   sexual	  difference.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   for	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   linguistic	   dimension	   in	   bio-­‐political	  production,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  mobilisation	   of	   the	   imaginary	   and	   the	   unconscious	   in	  mass-­‐mediatised	  politics.	  I	  will	  now	  try	  to	  explain	  why.	  
—IV The	   necessity	   for	   a	   new	   political	   anthropology—or	   according	   to	   some	   of	   a	   new	   political	  ontology—is	  emerging	   today	   in	   all	   the	  most	   acute	   analyses	  of	   the	   crisis	  of	  politics	   in	   the	  era	  of	  globalisation.13	  These	   analyses	   correctly	   attribute	   this	   crisis	  not	   only	   to	   the	  waning	  of	   the	   state	  form,	  but	   also,	  more	  profoundly,	   to	   the	  mutation	   that	   involves	   the	  modern	   individual,	   the	  basic	  structures	   of	   social	   relations,	   cultural	   and	   trans-­‐cultural	   codes,	   the	   configuration	   of	   work,	   the	  forms	   of	   bio-­‐power,	   the	   cognitive	   societies	   connected	   to	   new	   communication	   technologies.	   The	  central	   point	   is	   the	   exhaustion	  of	   the	  paradigm	  of	  modern	  politics	   and	   the	   anthropology	   it	  was	  founded	  on.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  collapse	  of	   that	  powerful	   construction	  based	  on	   the	   individual-­‐
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Leviathan	  couple	  that	  reigned	  uncontested	  over	  the	  West	  from	  the	  seventeenth	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  contribution	  that	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  brings	  to	  political	  theory	  needs	  to	  be	  situated	  at	  this	  level.	  The	   introduction	   of	   sexual	   difference	   into	   political	   discourse	   is	   not	   the	   same	   thing	   as	   the	  introduction	   of	   the	   female	   question,	   with	   its	   relative	   demands,	   in	   the	   cartography	   of	   complex	  societies.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   question	   of	   adding	   women	   to	   the	   catalogue	   of	   the	   oppressed,	   as	   the	  emancipationist	   tradition	  of	  Marxist	  descent	  used	  to	   think,	  or	  even	  of	  adding	  them	  to	   the	  plural	  composition	  of	  the	  multitude,	  as	  the	  new	  antagonist	  thought	  is	  tempted	  to	  suggest.	  It	  is	  a	  question,	  rather,	  of	  considering	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  the	  status	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  of	  the	  political	  subject,	  and	  its	  modes	  of	  constitution	  and	  mobilisation.	  The	  sexed	  subject	  is	  a	  subject	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  one,	  an	   individual	   that	   is	   no	   longer	   undivided;	   therefore,	   if	   we	  want	   to	   be	   exact,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   an	  individual	   (in	   fact	   the	   lexicon	   of	   difference	   has	   long	   replaced	   the	   term	   ‘individual’	  with	   that	   of	  singularity).	  The	  modern	  subject	  was	  neutral,	  sovereign	  in	  its	  rationality,	  a	  voluntary	  actor	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  an	  independent	  atom	  amongst	  other	  independent	  atoms.	  The	  subject	  of	  difference	  is	   embodied,	  marked	   by	   sexuality.	   He/she	   is	   not	   born	   of	   pure	   reason	   but	   of	   tensions	   between	  reason	  and	  drives,	  between	  the	  conscious	  and	  the	  unconscious,	  between	  will	  and	  desire.	  He/she	  has	  no	   illusions	  about	  sovereignty	  but	   is	  aware	   that	  he/she	  depends	  on	  relationships	   to	  others,	  and	  first	  and	  foremost	  on	  the	  relationship	  to	  the	  mother	  who	  is	  the	  matrix	  of	  life.14	  This	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   subject	   reverberates	   on	   all	   the	   key	   words	   of	   modern	   politics	  founded	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   individual:	   equality,	   liberty,	   fraternity,	   power,	   authority,	  representation,	   right,	   rights.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   sexed	   singularity	   the	   consideration	   of	  difference	   has	   revealed	   the	   fiction	   of	   equality	   and	   its	   homologising	   effects.	   It	   has	   revealed	   the	  abstract	   character	   of	   a	   liberty	   modelled	   on	   the	   atomised,	   sovereign	   individual	   and	   the	  exclusionary	   character	   of	   a	   fraternity	   that	   erases	   women	   from	   the	   social	   pact.15	   It	   has	   made	  evident	  the	  abstract	  character	  of	  juridical	  mediation	  and	  the	  depoliticising	  character	  of	  rights.16	  It	  has	  exposed	  the	  problematic	  confusion	  between	  power	  and	  authority	  and	  the	  secret	  connections	  between	   the	   totem	   of	   power	   and	   male	   sexuality.17	   It	   has	   revealed	   the	   complicity	   between	   the	  order	  of	  political	  representation	  and	  the	  order	  of	  linguistic	  representation.18	  Each	  of	  these	  points	  would	  merit	  serious	  consideration	  but	  there’s	  not	  space	  for	  that	  analysis	  here.	   I	   limit	   myself	   to	   pointing	   out	   that,	   as	   a	   whole,	   the	   critique	   that	   Italian	   feminist	   thought	  addresses	   to	   the	   conceptual	   constellation	   of	   modern	   politics	   introduces	   a	   healthy	   element	   of	  diffidence	   towards	   the	   democratic	   optimism	   that	   informs	   the	   war-­‐mongering	   propaganda	   of	  governments	  in	  the	  West	  (and	  has	  also	  seduced	  wide	  swathes	  of	  antagonist	  thought).	  The	  history	  of	   the	   original	   exclusion	   and	   the	   later	   inclusion	   of	   women	   into	   citizenship	   teaches	   us	   that	   the	  democratic	  paradigm,	  entirely	  constructed	  to	  suit	  the	  modern	  individual	  and	  its	   logic	  of	   identity	  and	  seriality,	  is	  undermined	  from	  its	  very	  beginnings	  by	  the	  disavowal	  of	  sexual	  difference	  and	  of	  difference	   tout	   court.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   endlessly	   flexible.	   The	   democratic	   paradigm	   does	   not	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tolerate	  the	  movement	  of	  difference	  and	  tends	  either	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  homogenisation,	  or	  to	  bring	  it	  back	  into	  the	  logic	  of	  identity.	  In	  effect,	  when	  women	  are	  included	  into	  citizenship	  it	  is	  either	  at	  the	  price	  of	  their	  homogenisation	  with	  men,	  or	  otherwise	  at	  the	  price	  of	  a	  translation	  of	   sexual	  difference	   (which	   concerns	   singularity	   and	   symbolic	   exchange),	   into	  a	   gender	   identity	  (that	  is,	  into	  a	  collective	  identity	  that	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  diverse	  social	  groups).	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  demonstrates	  its	  neutralising	  tendency;	  in	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  logic	  of	  identity	  is	  reconfirmed	  under	  the	  mask	  of	  a	  pluralism	  of	  differences.	  As	  we	  know	  from	  postcolonial	  feminism,	  the	  paradox	  becomes	  even	  more	  complicated	  when	  social,	   ethnic	   and	   cultural	   differences,	   which	   are	   not	   dealt	   with	   coherently	   by	   the	   grammar	   of	  rights,	  are	  added	  to	  gender	   identity.	  The	  result	   is	   the	  ungovernability	  of	  differences,	  both	   in	   the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  model	   that	   leads	   to	   a	   sum	   of	   self-­‐referential	   communities,	   and	   the	   assimilationist	  French	  model	  that	  came	  up	  with	  the	  law	  against	  the	  Islamic	  veil	  at	  school	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  the	  risks	  of	  communitarianism.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  danger	  that,	  within	  this	  scheme,	  women	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  once	  again	  becoming	  the	  passive	  object	  of	  a	  conflict	  between	  universalism	  and	  communitarianism	  which	  in	  reality	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  men.19	  This	   is	   clear	  both	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  French	   law	  against	   the	  veil	  and	   the	  American	  legitimisation	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  it	  is	  the	  value	  of	  secularism	  that	  is	  mobilised	  to	  liberate	  women	  from	  Islamic	  patriarchy,	  while	  in	  the	  second	  it	   is	  the	   value	   of	   freedom.	   Two	   pillars	   of	   Western	   democracy,	   both	   marked	   by	   a	   male	   history,	   are	  brandished	   as	   universal	   values.	   In	   both	   cases,	   Muslim	   women	   are	   caught	   in	   an	   unsustainable	  double	   bind	   between	   the	   patriarchal	   injunction	   of	   their	   communities	   and	   the	   assimilationist	  injunction	   of	   our	   democracies.	   In	   both	   cases,	   Western	   feminism	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   split	  between	   a	   solidarity	   with	   ‘other	   women’	   that	   doesn’t	   go	   beyond	   cultural	   relativism	   and	   the	  extension	  to	   ‘other	  women’	  of	  Western	  female	  emancipation.	   In	  both	  cases,	   these	  paradoxes	  can	  only	  be	  avoided	  by	  reorienting	  the	  question	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  female	  subjectivity	  and	  freedom	  and	  relations	  between	  women.20	  Only	  a	   first	  person	  account	  of	   the	  motivations	  that	  might	   lead	  a	  woman	  to	  wear	  the	  veil	  or	  refuse	  it,	  often	  endowing	  it	  with	  another	  meaning,	  can	  stand	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  justice,	  and	  not	  the	  abstract	   application	   of	   the	   universalistic	   principle	   of	   secularism	   or	   communitarian	   religious	  obligation.	  Only	  the	  relationship	  between	  women	  can	  creatively	  reinvent	  and	  recombine	  cultural	  differences	   otherwise	   doomed	   to	   non-­‐communication,	   uncovering	   the	   isomorphisms	   not	   only	  between	   forms	   of	   sexual	   oppression	   but	   also	   between	   the	   forms	   of	   female	   freedom	   that	   run	  through	  the	  hybridism	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  world.	  Once	  again,	  what	  is	  at	  play	  here	  is	  an	  unexpected	  cut	  in	  the	  prevailing	  order	  of	  discourse:	  female	  freedom	  is	  the	  litmus	  test	  of	  the	  unsustainability	  of	  conflicts	   that	   are	   badly	   posed	   and	   at	   an	   impasse,	   from	   the	   conflict	   between	   universalism	   and	  communitarianism	  to	  that	  which	  goes	  under	  the	  inauspicious	  name	  of	  the	  clash	  of	  civilisations.	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Naturally,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  be	  clear	  about	   the	   terms	  used.	  The	   female	   freedom	  referred	   to	  has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   advertising	   of	   freedom	   broadcast	   every	   day	   by	   the	   American	   and	  European	  neo-­‐conservatives,	  and	  is	  not	  a	  development	  but	  rather	  a	  radical	  critique	  of	  both	  liberal	  democratic	   theory	   and	   Marxist	   theories	   of	   liberation.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   freedom	   of	   an	   atomised	  individual,	   nor	   the	   project	   of	   a	   collective	   liberation	   from	   domination	   that	   can	   always	   be	  postponed.	   Rather	   it	   is	   freedom	   in	   action,	   lived	   in	   the	   present,	   of	   one	   singularity	   in	   relation	   to	  others.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  delusion	  of	  omnipotence	  by	  a	  rational,	  independent	  and	  sovereign	  subject,	  but	  a	   continuous	  negotiation	  between	  autonomy	  and	  dependence,	   learnt	   from	  working	   through	   the	  relationship	  to	  the	  mother.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  freedom	  founded	  on	  and	  guaranteed	  by	  formal	  rights,	  but	  an	  experience	  exposed	  to	  risk	  and	  open	  to	  the	  unpredictable.	  It	  is	  an	  event	  that	  is	  renewed	  each	  time	  a	  displacement	   in	   relations	  of	   power	   takes	  place,	   a	   decentring	  of	   phallocentrism,	   an	  opening	  of	  new	  spaces	  of	  sense	  and	  signification.	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  freedom	  that	  opens	  up	  in	  the	  present	  and	  modifies	   the	  present.	   Its	  aim	   is	   to	  empty	  power	  rather	   than	   to	  seize	   it,	   and	   it	  has	  no	  need	   for	  a	  general	  project	  or	  subject	  of	  subversion.21	  The	  freedom	  won	  by	  women	  all	  over	  the	  world	  in	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  under	  whatever	  constellation	  and	  configuration	  of	  power,	  is	  the	  concrete	  and	  living	  demonstration	  that	  another	  world	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  but	  is	  already	  real	  and	  operative	  in	  our	  present.	  
—V What	  remains	  of	  this	  freedom	  in	  the	  paradigms	  of	  radical	  and	  antagonistic	  thought?	  What	  remains	  of	   the	   subject	   of	   sexual	   difference	   in	   the	   figure	   of	   the	  multitude?	  What	   remains	   of	   the	   feminist	  mode	  of	  transformation	  in	  the	  subversive	  projects	  of	  the	  cognitariat?	  If	  we	  try	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  questions	  we	  find	  ourselves	  faced	  with	  a	  clear	  case	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  contagion	  between	  the	  thought	  of	   sexual	   difference	   and	   radical	   thought	  which	  was	  mentioned	   earlier.	   Such	   contagion	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   translation	   and	  mistranslation	   of	   respective	   categories	   and	  practices.	   And	   it	   also	   reshuffles	   the	   proximities	   and	   points	   of	   friction	   between	   the	   two	  perspectives.	  Certainly,	   the	   political	   lexicon	   has	   become	  more	   uniform,	   but	   beneath	   the	   common	   use	   of	  many	   words—singularity,	   difference,	   desire,	   materiality,	   biopolitics,	   politics	   of	   affect—crucial	  divergences	   remain	   and	   continue	   to	   present	   themselves.	   In	   the	   passage	   from	   the	   traditional	  individual–collective	   pair	   to	   the	   singular–common	   pair,	   and	   in	   the	   emphasis	   put	   on	   the	  hybridisation	   of	   difference,	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   multitude	   outlined	   by	   Antonio	   Negri	   and	   Michael	  Hardt	  in	  Empire	  and	  Multitudes	  seems	  to	  incorporate	  many	  elements	  of	  the	  feminist	  critique	  of	  the	  modern	  notion	  of	  the	  individual.22	  But	  a	  closer	   look	  suggests	  that	   this	   is	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  authors	  write,	   for	   instance,	   that	   the	  multitude	   is	   ‘living	   flesh’,23	  and	  yet—in	  the	  best	   tradition	  of	  Western	  political	   thought	  that	   from	  ancient	  Greece	  onwards	  has	   transformed	   the	  body	   into	  a	  metaphor	   in	  order	   to	   rid	   itself	   of	   real	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bodies—it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  body.24	  It	  is	  not	  a	  ‘political	  body’	  and	  it	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  so.	  It	  ends	  up	  ridding	   itself	  even	  of	   the	  biological	  body	   (in	   fact	   the	  authors	  claim	  a	  philosophy	  of	   linguistic	  performativity	   against	   the	   body).25	   Consequently,	   the	   multitude	   is	   not	   sexed.	   The	   difference	  between	  the	  sexes	  appears	  in	  the	  old	  form	  of	  the	  social	  condition	  of	  gender,	  not	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  sexed	  singularity,	  and	  the	  project	  is	  to	  neutralise	  its	  relevance	  rather	  than	  to	  give	  it	  significance	  in	  social,	   symbolic	   and	   political	   exchange.26	   Moreover,	   the	   multitude	   constitutes	   itself	   in	   the	  movement	   between	   the	   singular	   and	   the	   common,	   but	   between	   the	   singular	   and	   the	   common	  there	   is	   neither	   the	   intermediate	   passage	   nor	   the	   patient	   labour	   of	   constructing	   an	   inter-­‐subjective	  and	   interdependent	   language.	  Lastly	  and	  most	   importantly,	   the	  multitude	  moves,	   like	  capital,	  in	  a	  linear	  and	  progressive	  temporality,	  ignoring	  the	  obstacles	  of	  regression.	  It	  is	  animated	  by	   a	   desire	   that	   is	   only	   positivity,	   excess,	   the	   life	   drive,	   and	   never	   lack,	   ambivalence,	   the	   death	  drive.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  neither	  traversed	  by	  the	  negative	  nor	  by	  negative	  feelings	  such	  as	  fear,	  anxiety	  and	   dependence.	   Thus,	   in	   one	   gesture	   it	   eliminates	   all	   the	   work	   done	   by	   feminist	   practices	   to	  reintroduce	  into	  the	  constitution	  of	  subjectivity	  the	  mass	  of	  material	  that	  has	  been	  disavowed	  by	  political	  rationality—stumbling	  blocks,	  lapsus,	  repetitions,	  depressions,	  all	  that	  is	  unconscious	  in	  political	   discourse—that	   has	   always	   impeded	   subversive	   projects	   on	   the	   threshold	   between	  imagination	  and	  the	  compulsion	  to	  repeat.	  An	   analogous	   critique	   can	   be	   made	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   cognitariat	   and	   the	   utopias	   of	  communication	   of	   the	   last	   twenty	   years,	   which	   have	   rightly	   emphasised	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	  linguistic	   dimension	   in	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   real,	   while	   forgetting	   to	   anchor	   language	   in	  corporeality	   and	   relational	   communication.27	  Two	   images	  will	   suffice	   to	   illustrate	   the	  point:	   the	  image	   of	   a	   ‘general	   intellect’	  without	   a	   body,	   and	   the	   image	   of	   connection	  without	   relationship	  that	   characterises	   the	   use	   of	   the	   net.	   Even	   in	   this	   instance	   radical	   thought	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	  reproducing	  the	  split	  between	  body	  and	  language	  that	  is	  typical	  of	  Western	  epistemology.	  Again,	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  comes	  into	  sharp	  relief.	  It	  is	  an	  advantage	  which	  lies	  in	  having	  thought	  through	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  body	  and	  language:	  a	  body	  that	  doesn’t	  exist	  without	  signification	  and	  a	  language	  that	  means	  nothing	  if	  abstracted	  from	  the	  body.	  
—VI This	  disavowal	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  paradigm	  of	  the	  multitude	  and	  the	  cognitariat	  should	  be	  easily	  taken	   as	   a	   clear	   symptom	  of	   the	  disavowal	   of	   the	   feminist	   trajectory	  by	   radical	   Italian	   thought,	  since	   the	   disavowal	   of	   corporeality	   has	   always	   been	   associated	  with	   the	   cancellation	   of	   female	  genealogy	  from	  the	  political	  scene	  in	  Western	  political	  thought.	  However,	  current	  political	  events	  are	  calling	  us	  to	  push	  both	  male	  and	  the	  female	  radical	  thought	  toward	  other	  necessities:	  reports	  of	   global	   war,	   talk	   about	   the	   tortures	   in	   Abu	   Ghraib	   jail,	   the	   Beslan	   massacre,	   the	   hostages	  beheaded	  and	  the	  Italian	  pacifist	  women	  kidnapped	  in	  Baghdad.	  The	  number	  of	  American	  soldiers	  dead	  in	  Iraq	  is	  now	  more	  than	  one	  thousand.	  This	  news	  and	  these	  images	  are	  added	  to	  the	  naked	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bodies	   that	   three	   and	   a	   half	   years	   ago	   flew	   down	   from	   the	   Twin	   Towers	   in	   New	   York	   and	   to	  kamikaze	  cyborg	  bodies	  exploding	  here	  and	  there.	  What	   happens,	   in	   this	   landscape,	   with	   the	   end	   of	   modern	   politics,	   with	   the	   subversive	  imagination	  of	  Italian	  radical	  thought,	  with	  female	  freedom	  and	  the	  end	  of	  patriarchy?	  The	  events	  of	   the	   past	   decades,	   both	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   crisis	   and	   critique	   of	   politics,	   now	   have	   to	   face	   an	  anthropological	   catastrophe	   that	   includes	   sadism,	   fear	   and	   religious	  wars.	  Our	  perspective	   is	   in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  more	  Hobbes	  than	  Spinoza.	  But	  before	  delivering	  ourselves	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  new	  global	  Leviathan,	  which	  neverthless	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  on	  our	  horizon,	  we	  must	  save	  the	  image	  of	  politics	  of	  desire	  from	  mirroring	  conflict	  between	  the	  dying	  monster	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  the	  emerging	  monster	  of	  postmodern	  terrorism.	  The	   line	   between	   the	   possibility	   of	   change	   and	   the	   certainty	   of	   catastrophe	   has	   become	  extremely	   thin.	   We	   are	   faced	   with	   a	   bio-­‐power	   which	   controls	   naked	   life	   and	   a	   bio-­‐terrorism	  which	   responds	   with	   the	   practice	   of	   naked	   death:	   we	   are	   obliged	   to	   question	   once	   again	   the	  biological	   substratum	   of	   the	   human	   that	   is	   the	   ‘rock	   bottom’—to	   quote	   Freud—of	   the	   political	  community;	  we	  must	   bring	  back	   to	  naked	   life	   the	   language	   that	   turns	   the	  wild	   and	  mute	   social	  body	  into	  a	  speaking	  body	  politic.	  We	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  policy	  of	  affects	  which	  uses	  TV	  networks	  to	  colonise,	   manipulate	   and	  mobilise	   the	   individual	   unconscious	   and	   social	   imaginary,	   making	   us	  cold	  viewers	  of	  sadistic	  shows	  such	  as	  the	  torture	  in	  Abu	  Ghraib	  and	  the	  massacre	  of	  Beslan.	  We	  must	  invent	  affective	  mobilising	  practices	  and	  refined	  signifying	  practices	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  keep	   together	   the	   cognitive	   and	   the	   sensible,	   the	   rational	   and	   the	   imaginary,	   in	   order	   to	   divert	  daily	  the	  fold	  of	  significance	  that	  power	  attributes	  to	  events,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  modify	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  visible	  and	   the	   invisible,	   the	  speakable	  and	   the	  unspeakable,	  which	  mark	   the	  borders	  of	   the	  democratic	  public	  sphere.	  We	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  war	  where	  sexuality	  is	  explicitly	  at	  stake,	  a	  war	  that	  divides	  women	  between	  passive	  hostages	  of	  a	  male	  conflict	  and	  zealous	  torturers.	  We	  must	  reply	  with	   the	   female	   freedom	  we	   have	   gained,	  with	   the	   relationships	   among	  women	   that	   can	  make	  order	   from	   social	   disorder,	   with	   the	   cut	   of	   the	   sexual	   difference	   on	   the	   order	   of	   dominant	  discourse.	  Despite	  all	  this,	  I	  still	  believe	  that	  in	  this	  landscape	  the	  politics	  generated	  by	  feminism	  has	  the	  advantage.	  This	  is	  said	  with	  no	  sense	  of	  triumph:	  the	  photograph	  of	  Lyndie	  England	  with	  an	  Iraqi	  prisoner	  on	  a	  leash	  destroyed	  any	  remaining	  illusion	  of	  women’s	  moral	  superiority.	  It	  shows	  that	  even	   female	   sexuality	   can	   be	   prey	   to	   racist	   sadism	   and	   the	   desire	   for	   revenge.	   In	   the	   place	   of	  triumphalism	  there	  is,	  in	  my	  belief,	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  political	  practice	  of	  negativity,	  melancholy	  and	   depression.	   I	   agree	   with	   a	   recent	   proposal	   by	   Judith	   Butler	   for	   a	   ‘politics	   of	   mourning’	   to	  juxtapose	   the	   violent	   manipulation	   of	   mourning	   displayed	   by	   the	   American	   government	   after	  9/11.28	  This	  politics	  of	  mourning	  supposes	  a	  new	  ontology	  of	  globalisation,	  based	  on	  fragility,	  loss,	  extreme	  precariousness	  and	   interdependence	   in	  which	  we	  all	   live	   today.	  Because	  of	  our	  ancient	  history,	   as	  women	  we	   know	  what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   vulnerable,	   exposed,	   and	   potential	   objects	   of	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nullifying	   violence,	   as	   well	   as	   subjects	   of	   happily	   destabilising	   and	   dispossessing	   passions	   and	  desires.	   Due	   to	   a	   recent	   and	   uncertain	   citizenship,	   as	   women	   we	   know	   how	   to	   create	   politics	  ‘without	  believing	  we	  have	  rights’	  and	  without	  counting	  on	  the	  sovereignity	  of	  the	   individual,	  of	  the	  citizen,	  of	  the	  state.29	  From	  this	  condition	  more	  self-­‐consciousness	  can	  be	  developed,	  leading	  to	  a	  political	  practice,	  a	  public	  discourse	  which	  is	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  reiteration	  of	  strength	  by	  a	  wounded	  nation.	  And	  perhaps,	  after	  many	  decades	  spent	  in	  thinking	  about	  only	  conflict,	  it	  is	  now	  time	  to	  think	  of	  the	  twin	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  mourning,	  that	  is,	  a	  politics	  of	  love,	  the	  only	  potency	  we	  know	   able	   to	   translate	   the	   precariousness	   implied	   in	   the	   exposure	   to	   the	   other	   not	   in	   a	  devastating	  violence,	  but	  in	  a	  positive	  energy.30	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—NOTES 1	  In	  2003	  October,	  just	  one	  year	  before	  the	  Sydney	  conference	  on	  the	  ‘Italian	  Effect’,	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  visit	  some	  universities	  in	  Melbourne,	  Sydney	  and	  Auckland	  and	  to	  discuss	  Italian	  feminism	  with	  teachers	  and	  students.	  I	  thank	  Susanna	  Scarparo,	  Brett	  Neilson,	  Paolo	  Bartoloni,	  Bernadette	  Luciano	  for	  this	  opportunity.	  	  2	  These	  are	  the	  most	  important	  political	  practices	  in	  Italian	  feminism	  of	  sexual	  difference.	  See	  Libreria	  delle	  donne	  di	  Milano,	  Non	  credere	  di	  avere	  dei	  diritti,	  Rosenberg	  e	  Sellier,	  Torino,	  1987	  (Libreria	  delle	  donne	  of	  Milan,	  Sexual	  
Difference.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Social	  Symbolic	  Practice,	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  Bloomington	  1991);	  Lia	  Cigarini,	  La	  politica	  del	  
desiderio,	  Pratiche,	  Parma	  1995.	  See	  also	  Susanna	  Scarparo,	  ‘In	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  Mother’,	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  
Review.	  For	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘practice’,	  see	  my	  introduction	  ‘Il	  desiderio	  di	  politica’	  to	  Cigarini,	  pp.	  19–25.	  3	  For	  the	  method	  of	  beginning	  from	  oneself	  see	  Diotima,	  La	  sapienza	  di	  partire	  da	  sé,	  Liguori,	  Napoli,	  1996.	  For	  the	  metonymical	  relation	  between	  speaking	  and	  experience	  see	  Luisa	  Muraro,	  Maglia	  o	  uncinetto.	  Racconto	  linguistico-­‐
politico	  sull’inimicizia	  fra	  metafora	  e	  metonimia,	  manifestolibri,	  Rome,	  1999,	  and	  my	  introduction,	  ‘La	  parola	  del	  contatto’	  to	  this	  same	  volume.	  For	  the	  notion	  of	  female	  genealogy	  with	  regard	  to	  institutionalised	  tradition,	  see	  Diotima,	  
Approfittare	  dell’assenza:	  Punti	  di	  avvistamento	  sulla	  tradizione,	  Liguor,	  Napoli	  2002,	  in	  particular	  Wanda	  Tommasi,	  ‘Di	  madre	  in	  figlia’,	  pp.	  7–25.	  Diotima	  is	  the	  name	  of	  an	  important	  feminist	  comunity	  of	  philosophers	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Verona	  <http//www.diotimafilosofe.it>.	  4	  Giacomo	  Marramao,	  Passggio	  a	  Occidente,	  Bollati-­‐Boringhieri,	  Torino,	  2003,	  p.	  97.	  5	  In	  a	  letter	  written	  to	  the	  weekly	  L’Espresso	  in	  the	  decennial	  of	  ’68,	  quoted	  in	  Maria	  Luisa	  Boccia,	  L’io	  in	  rivolta:	  Vissuto	  e	  
pensiero	  di	  Carla	  Lonzi,	  La	  Tartaruga,	  Milano	  1990.	  Carla	  Lonzi	  was	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  most	  important	  Italian	  feminist	  thinkers.	  6	  For	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  feminism	  and	  1968–77	  see	  my	  ‘Le	  donne	  oltre	  la	  critica	  della	  politica,	  in	  Aa.Vv.,	  Millenovecentosettantasette,	  manifestolibri,	  Rome,	  1997;	  Maria	  Luisa	  Boccia,	  ‘Il	  patriarca,	  la	  donna,	  il	  giovane:	  La	  stagione	  dei	  movimenti	  nella	  crisi	  italiana’,	  in	  Aa.Vv.,	  L’Italia	  repubblicana	  nella	  crisi	  degli	  anni	  Settanta,	  vol.	  
II:	  Culture,	  nuovi	  soggetti,	  identità	  (a	  cura	  di	  Fiamma	  Lussana	  e	  Giacmo	  Marramao),	  Rubbettino,	  Soveria	  Mannelli,	  2003.	  For	  the	  relationship	  between	  workerism	  and	  feminist	  groups	  which	  developed	  in	  the	  1970s	  from	  within	  Potere	  Operaio,	  see	  the	  classical	  Maria	  Rosa	  Dalla	  Costa,	  Potere	  femminile	  e	  sovversione	  sociale,	  Marsilio,	  Padova,	  1974	  and	  Lucia	  Chisté,	  Alisa	  Dal	  Re,	  Edvige	  Forti,	  Oltre	  il	  lavoro	  domestico.	  Il	  lavoro	  femminile	  fra	  produzione	  e	  riproduzione,	  Feltrinelli,	  Milan,	  1979.	  For	  a	  rethinking	  of	  that	  relation	  today,	  see	  the	  interview	  with	  Alisa	  Dal	  Re	  nel	  cd-­‐rom	  allegato	  al	  volume	  di	  Guido	  Borio,	  Francesca	  Pozzi	  e	  Gigi	  Roggero	  Futuro	  anterior:	  Dai	  ‘Quaderni	  Rossi	  ai	  movimenti	  globali:	  
ricchezze	  e	  limiti	  dell’operaismo	  italiano’,	  Deriveapprodi,	  Rome,	  2002.	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  7	  Carla	  Lonzi,	  Sputiamo	  su	  Hegel,	  Scritti	  di	  Rivolta	  Femminile,	  Milan,	  1974,	  p.	  54.	  8	  Mario	  Tronti,	  La	  politica	  al	  tramonto,	  Einaudi,	  Torino,	  1998.	  Mario	  Tronti	  is	  the	  author	  of	  Operai	  e	  capitale	  (Einaudi,	  1966)	  and	  is	  considered	  the	  founder	  of	  workerism.	  9	  Aa.Vv.,	  E’	  accaduto	  non	  per	  caso,	  Sottosopra,	  Milano	  1996.	  10	  On	  the	  supposed	  essentialism	  of	  Italian	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  see	  Teresa	  De	  Lauretis’s	  introduction,	  ‘Taking	  Essentialism	  Seriously’,	  in	  Libreria	  delle	  donne	  of	  Milan.	  	  11	  Luisa	  Muraro,	  pp.	  91–104.	  On	  the	  thought	  of	  sexual	  difference	  as	  a	  cut,	  see	  also	  Paola	  Bono	  and	  Federica	  Giardini,	  ‘Crisis	  and	  Adventure’,	  Signs,	  vol.	  25,	  no.	  4,	  2000,	  pp.	  1027–32.	  12	  See	  my	  ‘La	  parola	  è	  la	  nostra	  politica’,	  in	  Annarosa	  Buttarelli,	  Luisa	  Muraro,	  Liliana	  Rampello	  (eds),	  Duemilauna,	  Pratiche,	  Milan,	  2001.	  	  13	  See	  among	  others	  Mario	  Tronti;	  Carlo	  Galli,	  La	  guerra	  globale,	  Laterza,	  Roma-­‐Bari	  2002;	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Impero,	  Rizzoli,	  Milano,	  2001	  (Empire,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2000);	  Judith	  Butler,	  Vite	  
precarie:Contro	  l’uso	  della	  violenza	  in	  risposta	  al	  lutto	  collettivo,	  Meltemi,	  Rome	  2004	  (Precarious	  Life:	  The	  powers	  of	  
Mourning	  and	  Violence,	  Verso,	  London,	  2004).	  	  14	  See,	  among	  others,	  Diotima,	  Il	  pensiero	  della	  differenza	  sessuale,	  La	  Tartaruga,	  Milano,	  1987;	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  
Dissonanze,	  La	  Tartaruga,	  Milano	  1994;	  Luisa	  Muraro,	  L’ordine	  simbolico	  della	  madre,	  Editori	  Riuniti,	  Roma,	  1991;	  Adriana	  Cavarero,	  Dire	  la	  nascita,	  in	  Diotima,	  Mettere	  al	  mondo	  il	  mondo:	  Oggetto	  e	  oggettività	  alla	  luce	  della	  differenza	  
sessuale,	  La	  Tartaruga,	  Milan,	  1990;	  Elena	  Pulcini,	  L’individuo	  senza	  passioni,	  Bollati-­‐Boringhieri,	  Torino,	  2001.	  	  15	  For	  the	  feminist	  critique	  to	  the	  1789’s	  triad	  liberty,	  equality,	  fraternity,	  see	  Maria	  Luisa	  Boccia,	  La	  differenza	  politica,	  Il	  Saggiatore,	  Milano,	  2002;	  Adriana	  Cavarero,	  La	  libertà	  come	  bene	  omune,	  in	  Eugenia	  Parise	  (ed.),	  La	  politica	  tra	  natalità	  e	  mortalità,	  Esi,	  Napoli,	  1993;	  Gabriella	  Bonacchi	  e	  Angela	  Groppi	  (eds),	  Il	  dilemma	  della	  cittadinanza,	  Laterza,	  Rome-­‐Bari,	  1993.	  	  16	  See	  Diana	  Sartori,	  ‘Ma	  non	  affidare	  il	  futuro	  ai	  diritti,	  in	  Aa.Vv,	  Globalizzazione	  e	  dritti	  futuri,	  manifestolibri,	  Rome,	  2004.	  17See	  Diotima,	  Oltre	  l’uguaglianza.	  Le	  radici	  femminili	  dell’autorità,	  Liguori,	  Naples,	  1995.	  	  18	  See	  my	  ‘La	  parola	  del	  contatto’.	  	  19	  See	  Etienne	  Balibar,	  ‘Dissonances	  dans	  la	  laïcité’,	  in	  Charlotte	  Nordmann	  (ed.),	  Le	  foulard	  islamique	  en	  question,	  éditions	  Amsterdam,	  Paris,	  2004,	  pp.	  23–4.	  20	  See	  my	  ‘Corpo	  e	  laicità.	  Il	  caso	  della	  legge	  sul	  velo’,	  in	  Geminello	  Preterossi	  (ed.),	  Le	  ragioni	  dei	  laici,	  Laterza,	  Rome-­‐Bari,	  2005.	  21	  For	  the	  notion	  of	  (female)	  freedom	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  sexual	  difference	  see	  my	  ‘L’eccedenza	  della	  libertà	  femminile’,	  in	  Ida	  Dominijanni	  (ed.),	  Motivi	  della	  libertà,	  Franco	  Angeli,	  Milano,	  2001.	  	  22	  See	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Impero,	  and	  Michael	  Hardt	  and	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Moltitudine,	  Rizzoli,	  Milano	  2004	  (Multitude,	  Penguin	  Press,	  2004).	  23	  Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  Moltitudine,	  pp.	  221–4.	  24	  See	  Adriana	  Cavarero,	  Corpo	  in	  figure,	  Feltrinelli,	  Milan,	  1995.	  25	  Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  Moltitudine,	  p.	  233.	  	  26	  Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  Moltitudine,	  p.125.	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  discuss	  these	  points	  with	  Antonio	  Negri	  at	  a	  session	  of	  Università	  Nomade,	  Padova	  29–30	  January	  2005,	  available	  at	  <http://www.globalproject.com>	  	  27	  See	  Franco	  Berardi	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  Review.	  	  28	  Butler,	  Precarious	  Life	  :	  Powers	  of	  Mourning	  and	  Violence,	  Verso,	  London,	  2003.	  29	  To	  quote	  the	  title	  of	  Libreria	  delle	  donne	  di	  Milano.	  	  30	  I	  developed	  this	  meaning	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  morning	  and	  a	  politics	  of	  love	  as	  twins	  in	  a	  conference	  organised	  in	  December	  2004	  by	  Diotima	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Verona,	  which	  will	  be	  published	  in	  the	  net-­‐journal	  ‘Per	  amore	  del	  mondo’,	  available	  at	  <http://www.diotimafilosofe.it>.	  
